



# **FORCE PROTECTION AS A BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM**

**A Monograph  
by**

**Major Michael D. Winstead  
Infantry**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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Major Michael D. Winstead

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System

Approved by:

Robert H. Berlin

Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Monograph Director

Gregory Fontenot

COL Gregory Fontenot, MA, MMAS

Director, School of  
Advanced Military  
Studies

Philip J. Brookes

Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate  
Degree Program

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# ABSTRACT

FORCE PROTECTION AS A BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEM by MAJ Michael D. Winstead, USA, 53 pages.

This monograph discusses the need for a common understanding and definition of the term force protection in U.S. Army doctrine. In recent deployments to Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda commanders and soldiers have stated that force protection is there number one concern. Therefore the goal of this monograph is to offer a detailed list of the components of it in keeping with the format used for other battlefield operating systems (BOS), in TRADOC PAM 11-9.

The monograph first examines the historical example of the United States Army's involvement in the Philippine War of 1899-1902. The characteristics of that conflict and similarities to current OOTW missions are analyzed. A list of lessons concerning protection from that era that may be useful for today is provided.

The monograph then examines U.S. involvement in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE (December 1992-May 1994). The emphasis is on 10th Mountain Division's experience relating to force protection issues encountered in Somalia. Much of this section centers on the role of Rules of Engagement (ROE) in force protection.

The final section offers an example BOS that is subdivided and numbered in accordance with the tactical BOS's listed in TRADOC PAM 11-9. This blueprint for a force protection BOS is offered for addition to the others only in the restraining conditions of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) as defined in FM 100-5 Operations, June 1993.

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## PART I. INTRODUCTION

In the post Cold War world the United States Armed Forces are receiving an ever increasing variety and number of non-traditional missions from the national command authority. These missions are in response to a strategy of engagement and enlargement to keep the United States involved in a world where ethnic, religious and economic strife have not decreased with the end of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup>

Many of these trouble areas are not at war in the traditional sense. There are likely to be no fronts or battle lines in the conventional concept. Bringing a degree of stability, humanitarian aid, and rebuilding infrastructure are the most common missions required of commanders and units in this new setting. Current U.S. Military doctrine terms such missions collectively as Operations Other Than War (OOTW).

OOTW operations are increasing the rate of deployments for U.S. Armed Forces with the all the risks that come with being in an unfamiliar and sometimes hostile land. The first OOTW titled operation, as defined by FM 100-5 Operations, June 1993,<sup>2</sup> came in December 1993 with Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia. That mission was in response to the wide spread starvation and civil strife present in the east African nation. Endemic banditry had made United Nations' and humanitarian relief missions unsuccessful, thus requiring armed force to protect food distribution services. Billed initially as a humanitarian

mission, it appeared not to be particularly threatening to the UN forces involved.<sup>3</sup>

However even OOTW missions can be quite deadly as the events of the 3 October 1993 raid by Task Force Ranger in Mogadishu, Somalia showed. That failed raid resulted in the deaths of 18 U.S. soldiers and the wounding of 78 more.<sup>4</sup>

The visible results of that mission echoed around the world to the United States. The grisly pictures of dead Americans being hauled through the streets caused a public outcry. The events of that day prompted members of Congress to take note of U.S. involvement and objectives in Somalia. Senator John McCain, Republican, Arizona, said unnecessary loss of American lives requires scrutiny by the Congress. He was referring to the intense debate in both houses immediately after the failed raid of 3 Oct. 1993. During that Congressional debate the President decided to order all troops out of Somalia within six months.<sup>5</sup>

Somalia underscores a dilemma for commanders conducting OOTW missions in the current environment. Concern with keeping casualties to an absolute minimum is as important as always but mission parameters, rules of engagement, and political considerations may inhibit traditional means of protecting the force. A commander may not be able to use the normally overwhelming U.S. forces' technological, firepower and maneuver capabilities. Protecting the force within an OOTW mission requires restraint and an attitude that may be at odds with the traditional warrior ethic of commanders and their units. Little



in current U.S. Army doctrine exists, however, to describe solutions to this OOTW dilemma.<sup>6</sup>

Many of the issues currently facing the United States Army in OOTW are similar to those of the Philippine War at the turn of the century. The Army of that era found itself confronted with a new and daunting task for which it had little preparation or written intellectual thought in the form of doctrine. An examination of the lessons of that era and those of recent experience should demonstrate the pertinent and enduring lessons of how to protect forces in OOTW type operations.<sup>7</sup>

## PART II: BACKGROUND OF THE PHILIPPINE WAR

The American presence in the Philippines came as a result of victory over Spain in the Spanish-American War. Primarily the U.S. fought to "liberate the Cuban people from Spanish oppression." The war also resulted in Spain's loss of the overseas territories of Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippine Islands.<sup>8</sup>

President William McKinley's strategy for the Spanish American War included the elimination of Spain's forces from Cuba, Guam and the Philippines. In the Pacific, Commodore George Dewey led the U.S. Navy Fleet's defeat of the Spanish Fleet in Manila Bay on 1 May 1898. This led to the first of roughly 12,000 ground troops of the VIIIth Corps going ashore in Manila in July of 1898 under command of Major General Wesley Merritt.<sup>9</sup>

At first U.S. policy was not clear on the mission of these troops other than occupation of the capital and accepting surrender of Spanish forces in the area. The Spanish in the Philippines did not want to fight the Americans. The Spanish commanders had received little guidance from the political leadership in Madrid and were in a quandary what actions to take. A standoff developed where American and Spanish forces occupied portions of Manila but with no attempt to force a decision. The living conditions worsened for the Spanish as they were cutoff from Spain by Dewey's victory and pressured by rising guerrilla forces under Filipino revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo. They had little to eat and munition stores were inadequate.<sup>10</sup>

Negotiations between General Merritt and the Spanish commander found a solution acceptable to all. The U.S. and Spanish commanders staged a sham battle between their forces to assuage the Spanish Commander's conscience and protect the city from Filipino soldiers already fighting for independence. With the fake actions completed Merritt took control of Manila on 13 August 1898. U.S. forces remained in and around Manila as President William McKinley, the Congress, and the political parties debated the wisdom of retaining control of the Philippines.<sup>11</sup>

Many wanted the islands as a part of the expansionist policy championed by proponents of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's theories. His ideas called for the retention of such possessions as basing areas for the U.S. fleet and to support American commercial interests. With such desires gaining the upper hand in

U.S. foreign policy the President decided to retain control of the islands. When Spain officially ceded the islands to the United States with the Treaty of Paris on 10 December 1898 the President had decided that the Philippines would become a U.S. territory.<sup>12</sup>

Emilio Aguinaldo, the key Filipino revolutionary leader, understood clearly the American motivation for retaining control of the islands. Those imperialist designs for basing and economic gain caused Aguinaldo and the Filipino's to resort to active combat. The revolutionary leaders did not believe or accept U.S. assertions that occupation was to establish the required institutions for self government of the Philippines at a later date.<sup>13</sup>

Just before the Spanish-American War Aguinaldo contacted Commodore Dewey and the American Consul-General in Singapore, Mr. E. Spencer Pratt. The potential revolutionary leader wanted to see if America might support Philippine independence. They led him to believe that an American victory over Spain could result in Philippines independence. At the time Aguinaldo was highly supportive of U.S. military action in the islands as it could help him defeat the Spanish.<sup>14</sup>

However, the continued delay in granting independence led to distrust and the 4 February 1899 showdown between Filipino and American forces that started the Philippine War. The lesson for today is that promises once made must be kept or good will can quickly develop into hatred and armed conflict. Even if those promises come from the national-strategic level they can have a very real effect at the tactical level. Therefore tactical

leaders must be aware of the likely effect that political decisions will have on their operations and take the necessary precautions.

The showdown of 4 February 1899 that started the Philippine War began when an American soldier on sentry duty challenged and then fired on several Filipino guerrillas testing U.S. positions and resolve. Fighting escalated to an armed clash that resulted in two days of heavy fighting with 59 dead and 278 wounded Americans. There had been no intention to start a conflict that day by the Americans or Filipinos. It came as a result of over eager U.S. troops with poor command and control.<sup>15</sup>

The Filipino forces engaged in that initial action suffered anywhere from two to five thousand casualties. These were the conventional style forces of revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo that the U.S. Army engaged and continued to face in the first months of the conflict. The majority of the early engagements centered on Manila, the capital. Aguinaldo decided that he must fight a conventional style war to gain legitimacy in the eyes of other nations. At that time guerrilla or insurgency style tactics were frowned upon by nearly all established nation states. However, the decision to fight conventionally by the Filipinos offered the Americans some important advantages.<sup>16</sup>

The first commander, MG Merritt, a decorated Civil War veteran, his assistant Major General Elwell S. Otis, and roughly 10,000 regular and national guard troops left over from the actions of the Spanish-American War provided the initial forces. Conventional battles continued throughout the year of 1899 until

General Otis, who succeeded General Merritt, declared that the destruction of Aguinaldo's forces had been completed by December. Aguinaldo and his regular forces were unsuccessful in these types of operations against the U.S. Army. Early engagements around Manila allowed American forces to use naval gunfire support. The Filipinos without such heavy fire support could not inflict the same casualties on the U.S. forces. With little hope of success the Filipino revolutionary movement had to adopt a new plan of action.<sup>17</sup>

The lesson for today from this period of the Philippine War concerns the current concept of Rules of Engagement or ROE. If the ROE is permissive and the enemy offers a targetable formation then overwhelming application of U.S. firepower is likely to be sufficient to provide a considerable amount of force protection. Conversely, restrictive ROE or dispersed enemy formations and tactics will likely require innovative measures to ensure protection. Tactics employed in guerrilla warfare and OOTW are usually dispersed and difficult for U.S. firepower to significantly affect. The one caveat not present in the Philippines is the problem of multiple factions. If multiple factions exist, then impartiality, even in the use of heavy firepower becomes critical.

With conventional tactics not working Aguinaldo realized the need to adopt guerrilla warfare to achieve independence. The warfare methods accepted by the western world as legitimate were unsuited to his forces capabilities and desires. On 12 November

1899 Aguinaldo decided to adopt guerrilla warfare and continue the struggle for a Philippine nation.

In response to the change in Filipino tactics a transformation also occurred in the U.S. Army's conduct of operations. The Americans found a similar need to disperse to effectively combat small bands of Filipino insurgents operating not just in Manila but across all the major islands of the Philippines.<sup>18</sup>

The guerrilla phase and President McKinley's decision to make all the islands a U.S. territory required greater military commitment. Troop levels increased to 56,000 in order to control all the islands with 413 remote bases and camps in place by September 1900. Major General Arthur MacArthur, father of Douglas MacArthur, who had assumed command in April 1900 began a campaign not unlike the ones waged against the American Indians.<sup>19</sup>

Operating in so many locations made it difficult for the technological and firepower advantages such as naval gunfire and artillery of U.S. forces to be applied. This was because combating the Filipino forces required small unit patrolling and pacification measures. Additionally, before the appearance of radio, supporting arms could not affect small unit action very easily. Higher level commanders pushed command and control of the units down to very low levels for the same reasons. Often company grade officers acted as the senior American officials in large areas of the islands.<sup>20</sup>

The nature of small unit actions in the Philippines provided advantages and disadvantages. Success in each area of the islands

depended in large measure on the efficiency and resourcefulness of local troop leaders and their men. This led to wide variances in effectiveness and casualty rates. Because of the dispersal of units and limited communications technology higher level commanders could offer little direction to help those leaders having difficulties. However this same isolation from higher guidance had advantages too.

Dispersal allowed subordinates maximum flexibility in attacking the rebels and their support. Local commanders were free to make trial and error decisions on tactics, weapons, and intelligence sources. Furthermore, since most U.S. forces remained in one area for an extended period of time the local district commander and his men became very familiar with the personalities and peculiarities of their assigned areas. In most cases this detailed knowledge helped establish good local intelligence networks on what the insurgents were doing and their methods.<sup>21</sup>

The lesson from this aspect of the Philippine experience is that a balance must be reached between higher level command guidance and allowing subordinates to use initiative in adapting to local conditions. Responsible commanders and headquarters may need to adapt ROE to each area and region. Leaders should consider keeping units in the same area for the duration of their scheduled tour of duty so that effective intelligence, rapport, and operational methods can be developed. Before deploying special units and missions into an area greater liaison and coordination with the forces that have long term experience in that location will need consideration. These measures should help

in identifying the threats to force protection and may result in fewer casualties. One lesson from the Philippines that was true of all locations was the negative results achieved from mistreatment of combatants and civilians.

A definite characteristic of most of the Philippine War was the cruelty shown by both sides in conduct of operations. Any isolated U.S. garrison, patrol or convoy was liable to ambush and massacre. The American soldiers in return meted out harsh punitive raids burning villages and killing men, women, and children. Torture of captives and civilians was common. The usual technique was the "water treatment." This consisted of forcing the victim to ingest several gallons of water quickly then pressing on the stomach causing intense pain. Although effective in obtaining information the process often resulted in death of the captive. Research indicates that inhuman, harsh, and illegal activities were counterproductive to cooperation between U.S. forces and locals, which was counter to the opinion of many of the U.S. military leaders of the era. This lesson should not be lost on commanders today. Discipline and legal considerations play a key role in all military activities, especially in the politically sensitive environment of OOTW.<sup>22</sup>

As commanders adapted to local conditions resulting in improved performance in the field during the year of 1900 the insurgency's intensity continued to increase. The national elections set for November in the United States offered Aguinaldo an opportunity. He felt that renewed guerrilla activity and increased casualties might make the U.S. involvement even more



unpopular with the American public. He hoped this would sway the election in favor of the Democratic Party which strongly opposed U.S. expansionism in the Philippines.<sup>23</sup>

The teaching point here is that most foreign national and insurgent leaders will be aware of the U.S. political environment and attempt to manipulate it. The tactical commander must therefore identify those areas and operations that represent the greatest opportunity for the enemy to influence the domestic American political agenda. In OOTW those areas will likely not be the most important military targets but those with the most shock value.

William McKinley and the Republican Party were reelected in the United States that fall. This greatly discouraged Aguinaldo and for the first time Filipino enthusiasm for the war with the U.S. declined. With McKinley remaining in office Aguinaldo realized that the U.S. would continue with pacification and counterinsurgency.<sup>24</sup> The developments in the strategic situation produced tactical effects and the results were a boost to American military efforts in the Philippines.

The strategic setback for the Filipino insurgents demonstrates the linkage between the levels of war or conflict. If a local war lord or insurgent leader perceives U.S. commitment to be weak or short lived it is likely to encourage attack and resistance. With a clear long term American commitment those same leaders may lose control over some elements of the population and cooperation can begin to occur with U.S. forces. Although the tactical commander has no control over political decisions his

efficient conduct of operations with minimal casualties is likely to extend the tolerance for long term U.S. domestic support for the operation.<sup>25</sup> Just as Aguinaldo was losing support the U.S. Congress decided to give a financial boost to the American presence in the Philippines.

Starting in February 1901, in response to increased pressure of the previous year before the election, the U.S. Congress appropriated money for recruiting 12,000 local Filipino scouts. These scouts would receive a regular paycheck from U.S. forces based on their effectiveness in locating insurgent forces. The scouts proved instrumental in breaking the information barrier that still existed for U.S. forces in the field and provided an island wide intelligence network not based on local conditions alone.<sup>26</sup>

An additional help with intelligence came from investigations conducted by U.S. Army officers that concluded many of the local officials were bipartisan in loyalties. The U.S. Army had set up local governments and officials from town and village chiefs. The Army attempted to exercise western style government and services through these locally recruited officials. One of these investigations conducted the year before in May 1900 by a Captain William T. Johnston discovered that those same officials were taking U.S. funds and supporting local guerrilla activities. Commanders then took actions to curb these bipartisan activities in the countryside as a result of these investigations.<sup>27</sup>

Here current tactical commanders must realize that financial and material support may only buy partial loyalty. Placing the lives and protection of U.S. and allied forces in the hands of such connections requires careful research along with constant reevaluation. Information and intelligence provided by these sources requires verification, if possible, by alternate methods. Certainly the Philippine War was not the last case of bipartisan loyalties.

Using friendly native scouts disguised as guerrillas, Brigadier General Frederick Funston, Commander of the 4th District on Luzon, and several American officers posing as their prisoners surprised and captured Aguinaldo in his headquarters in March 1901. This was a severe blow to the Philippine insurgent movement. Then on 19 April 1901 Aguinaldo made a proclamation to the Filipino people to cooperate with the Americans.<sup>28</sup> His statements and apparent cooperation with the enemy proved disheartened to the remaining Filipino insurgents. Funston eliminated Aguinaldo with good intelligence, planning, and a large measure of luck. The results made it a risk worth taking.

This seems to be an effective method at breaking the back of an insurgency. However, this may only be true where one key leader is critical to effective resistance by the insurgents against military action. Such a tactic does have risks as will be seen in Somalia later. Failure to eliminate a key leader once targeted may only strengthen his resolve and prestige in the eyes of his followers.

At the same time as Aguinaldo's capture President McKinley began another program designed to weaken the Filipino insurgency. In April 1901 he appointed a reluctant William H. Taft to the post of civilian governor of the Philippines. With a mandate in hand and the funds to accomplish it, Taft went to work establishing effective municipal and social programs in the islands.<sup>29</sup>

Of particular emphasis for Taft and the new civilian government in the Philippines was establishing a modern public education system. Under Spanish rule very few Filipinos received permission or possessed the funds necessary to get a formal education. Those few that did receive one became the only natives to acquire anything like a decent standard of living, albeit under strict Spanish tutelage. Consequently a formal education became a prized and much sought after quality in Filipino society. The ability of Taft's governorship to deliver on the educational benefits went a long way to eroding the influence of the independence movement.<sup>30</sup>

The lesson here is that the ability to offer tangible material goods and services may assist in reducing opposition to the presence of U.S. armed forces. In most cases of OOTW this was the primary reason for involvement in the first place. Therefore the tactical commander should never allow himself to forget the original reason for his presence in country, if he knows the purpose in the first place.

The insurgency now without Aguinaldo, facing native scouts that had detailed knowledge of the land, and an effective array of American social programs, became desperate. Massacres of

Americans and collaborating Filipinos became increasingly brutal. This alienated the local population even more to the idea of fighting for independence. With long term commitment seeming to be assured by McKinley's reelection the insurgency needed only one more blow to seal its fate.<sup>31</sup>

Starting on 1 December 1901 and continuing until 30 April 1902 Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell conducted a controversial but effective campaign against the remaining guerrilla forces in southwestern Luzon. Bell designed a program that made continuing the resistance almost unbearable for the remaining insurgents. His most important objective was disarmament of the insurgent forces. An earlier attempt under General MacArthur's command to initiate an arms buy back program was an utter failure. Bell concentrated instead on ruthless search and seizure methods in all villages and suspected hideouts.<sup>32</sup> Fortunately for Bell the Filipinos had no real allies in the world and their geographic separation from any sources of firearms and international media attention aided him in disarming them.

General Bell instituted severe punishment for towns and villages suspected of being pro-revolutionary. Essentially U.S. forces surrounded such locations and cut off all outside trade or contact. American commanders considered all native civil leaders guilty until proven innocent. Units disbanded all local police forces and confiscated their weapons. Captured guerrillas faced the death penalty unless they joined the Americans completely by providing information and became scouts. Bell also established concentration or protected zones. This practice entailed moving

into a guerrilla area and announcing that all people must within a certain period of time bring their family and possessions into these specified areas. After that time all goods and persons outside the protected zones Bell considered to be of the enemy and liable for the appropriate treatment. In the end Bell himself believed that effective enticements of social reforms and severe unrelenting military pressure on guerrillas and their support would bring a successful conclusion. And that is largely true. On 4 July 1902, two months after General Bell concluded his campaign the U.S. Army declared an end to the operations in the Philippines.<sup>33</sup>

The key point here is that disarming the resistance to U.S. forces is important to achieving the endstate and protecting the lives of U.S. service men and women. However voluntary programs such as arms buy-back initiatives are not likely to be effective. Isolation of a particular area, then a detailed search and confiscation process also requires follow up programs that will keep arms from flowing back into the region again. Each situation is likely to require different techniques requiring considerable study and innovation by local commanders.

The Philippine War resulted in 126,468 U.S. troops serving in its many engagements. A total of 4,234 Americans died and 2,818 were wounded. The Filipinos suffered approximately 20,000 killed in action with an unknown number of wounded and civilian casualties. Standards of behavior and discipline for U.S. soldiers in that conflict contributed to many civilian Filipino casualties. There are many lessons about protecting American

lives thorough good planning, proper intelligence collection, and effective, humane execution in the study of that conflict. However, there are also many negative examples that should be avoided. Both categories are instructional.<sup>34</sup>

### PART III THE LESSONS FOR FORCE PROTECTION FROM THE PHILIPPINE WAR

The Philippine War is a valuable teaching lesson for the U.S. Army's current scope of OOTW missions. The difficulty of protecting the force in that environment when studied will help the current tactical commander with similar conditions. Although now recognized as a war it bears many characteristics with recent and current operations like Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. It is therefore useful to recap in bullet form the lessons discussed above.

1. Promises made to local leaders must be kept if at all possible.
2. The traditional American superiority in technology and firepower offers good force protection but may not be appropriate in OOTW or dispersed guerrilla type operations.
3. Balance must be achieved between higher command guidance and local commander initiative. Allowing greater freedom in making changes to the plan for operations by subordinates should be considered.
4. Commanders should consider adapting ROE based on factors that change with location and mission.
5. Units should be kept in the same operational area so as to develop effective human intelligence, local rapport, and operational methods.

6. Foreign national and insurgent leaders are aware of the U.S. domestic political environment and will attempt to manipulate it with the tactical situation.

7. The degree of U.S. political resolve has a direct effect on enemy activities and an indirect effect on force protection.

8. Commanders should remember that local contacts and allies may be bipartisan in their loyalties.

9. Effective disarmament programs must start early and be a continuing process.

10. Never lose sight of the original purpose of the OOTW mission.

With these ten points learned from the Philippine War of 1899 - 1902 a commander can gain insight into some of the hazards to protecting his forces that remain valid for the OOTW missions of today.<sup>35</sup> However much has changed in the world in the 92 years since the end of that conflict. The U.S. Army has deployed many new technologies, organizations, and methods combined with different intellectual ideas in the form of doctrine. The world political environment has drastically changed requiring the addition and modification of those earlier lessons with recent experience. Therefore the next section of this monograph will examine the U.S. Army's experience in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 as it applies to force protection.

#### PART IV. OPERATIONS RESTORE HOPE AND CONTINUE HOPE

Somalia's descent into anarchy with no centralized form of government and warring factions split along clan lines began in early 1991 with the overthrow of Somali President Mohamed Siad



Barre. Constant turf wars and struggles to control the flow of international relief supplies and locally produced food supplies resulted in the already marginal conditions for living to drop below survival level for most Somalis. By 1992 millions of Somalis, mostly women and children were starving to death. Food became the source of wealth and power and the rival clans controlled it. The clans controlled most of the food production of local farmers and that distributed by international relief organizations through extortion, threats, and racketeering.<sup>36</sup>

These conditions, through international media coverage, attracted the attention of the United Nations and ultimately that of the United States by the summer of 1992. World opinion demanded that something be done to alleviate the starvation conditions in Somalia through humanitarian actions. The U.S. involvement in humanitarian operations in Somalia actually began in August of that year. Initially they consisted of transporting food supplies to remote areas of the country by U.S. Air Force aircraft, primarily C130s, and of providing a limited amount of medical support by special operations forces medical personnel.<sup>37</sup>

Aircrew flew missions primarily out of Mombasa, Kenya to airfields in Somalia during daylight hours only. All U.S. military personnel wore civilian clothes at the request of Kenyan authorities, which also lessened the tensions with Somalia gunmen at the airfields in Somalia and Non-Governmental relief agency workers at all locations. This period of U.S. involvement was known as Operation Provide Relief. It continued until the start of Operation Restore Hope on 3 December 1992. During its conduct

there were no U.S. casualties and no U.S. forces remained on the ground in Somalia except during the off loading of relief supplies and during administration of medicines and medical treatment.<sup>38</sup>

Conditions in Somalia in the summer of 1992 had become so marginal that the actions of Operation PROVIDE RELIEF provided only a fraction of the aid needed. For the populace of Somalia to receive an adequate amount of foodstuffs required the type logistical and security capability present in the armed forces of a major power or coalition. The United Nations and other relief organizations had a fair capability to distribute food but only if Somali warlords remained in check. In response to this need for relief aid escort President Bush decided to deploy ground combat units to Somalia in December 1992.<sup>39</sup>

The deployment and initial mission to assist in relief operations received the title, Operation RESTORE HOPE and it lasted from 3 December 1992 till 4 May 1993. This operation consisted of four phases; I Deployment / Securing airfields and ports, II Expansion of operations to provide security to humanitarian relief operations, III Expansion of security missions to outlying areas, IV Hand-off of theater missions to UN forces. The majority of the U.S. forces during this operation came from I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) of Camp Pendleton, California; the 10th Mountain Division of Fort Drum, NY.; Naval forces of the U.S. Seventh Fleet; and airlift assets of the U.S. Air Mobility Command along with many other allied air forces and commercially contracted aircraft. RESTORE HOPE was primarily a U.S. affair. Realizing that the mission was likely to continue for sometime the

United States moved to place greater responsibility for the operation under United Nations control with strong U.S. logistical support and security. Thus United Nations Operations Somalia I (RESTORE HOPE) came to an end.<sup>40</sup>

The hand-off of missions to the United Nations Operations Somalia II or UNOSOM II in May 1993 did not end the requirement for U.S. armed forces. UNOSOM II (U.S. Operation CONTINUE HOPE) ran from 4 May 1993 till April 1994 for U.S. forces. I MEF and 10th Mountain Division both maintained ground combat forces in Somalia to assist the UN command in the continuing mission to curb the power of local warlords who threatened equitable food distribution. The U.S. Navy and Air Force also continued their missions primarily concerned with logistical support, airlift, and sealift.<sup>41</sup>

During UNOSOM II the Somali warlord Mohammed Farrah Aideed precipitated an armed conflict starting 5 June 1993 with an attack on Pakistani forces in which 23 Pakistani soldiers died. After that time it became UN policy, possibly at U.S. insistence, to try to capture Aideed in order to break the power of the most obstinate warlord in Mogadishu.<sup>42</sup>

This resulted in a number of fire fights, ambushes, sniping, and mining incidents between UN. forces (which included many U.S. units) and the Somali factions. In one of these encounters on 3 October 1993, U.S. special operation forces made an attempt to capture Aideed and his subordinates in the Bokhara Market in Mogadishu. American forces captured many of Aideed's subordinates but he either escaped or was not present. In the process however

18 U.S. soldiers died and 78 were wounded.<sup>43</sup> Shortly afterwards President William Clinton, under public and congressional pressure to end the Somalia involvement, announced that all U.S. troops would leave Somalia in six months. On 31 March 1994 Operation CONTINUE HOPE, the title of U.S. participation in UNOSOM II, came to an end.<sup>44</sup>

During these three missions, Operations PROVIDE RELIEF, RESTORE HOPE, and CONTINUE HOPE the number one concern for U.S. commanders and their personnel was force protection.<sup>45</sup> Therefore a detailed examination of the procedures, equipment, and effectiveness of enhancing force protection is in order. Key to understanding protection measures is a comprehensive study of the threats to the force. The threats in Somalia consisted primarily of two types. Those types are military/paramilitary, and criminal.<sup>46</sup>

The military/paramilitary threats in Somalia differed from the types that conventional forces normally deal with. There were no uniformed adversaries and little heavy equipment in use by the Somalis. One exception to this were the presence of crew served weapons mounted on pick-up trucks and four-wheel drive vehicles known as "Technicals". These vehicles were the primary source of visible armed strength of the clans and openly operated on the streets of the major cities before Operation RESTORE HOPE. U.S. forces confiscated on sight all Somalis operating "technicals" or any crew served weapon and if necessary attacked to eliminate the threat.<sup>47</sup> Mines, sniping with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and ambushes were the other major threats. These

visible threats were relatively easy to deal with because the Somalis were poorly trained. Additionally, the U.S. Central Command rules of engagement allowed for self protection from such weapons and threats defined as a hostile intent by their very presence and therefore subject to immediate engagement. The main effort was to ensure that the ROE did not limit a unit or individual from eliminating those weapons that constituted a clear and present threat to force protection.<sup>48</sup>

To understand protection in Somalia requires a detailed look at the USCENTCOM ROE used in Operations RESTORE HOPE and CONTINUE HOPE and how that may have enhanced or inhibited protection. In Somalia ROE was initially developed by USCENTCOM from its peacetime standard format. During predeployment preparation both I MEF and 10th Mountain Division developed changes to the USCENTCOM ROE and submitted requests for its modification.<sup>49</sup> Units incorporated some changes then, but the majority came as a result of actual experience in Somalia.<sup>50</sup> Upon deployment each soldier received an ROE card with the approved ROE and reminders that this was a humanitarian operation not a war. The intent was to emphasize the requirement for restraint in use of force in the OOTW environment.<sup>51</sup> The ROE allowed immediate engagement of crew served weapons. It also allowed for self protection from any deadly threat directed against an individual or unit. Difficulties arose over indirect threats such as rioting crowds and criminal activities such as theft of sensitive military equipment. Confusion also existed around the issue of when was it appropriate to use non-lethal versus lethal force.<sup>52</sup>

Most Somalis lived in extreme poverty and theft became a common way of sustaining life, especially for young men and children. As a result U.S. personnel constantly guarded all equipment, food and water supplies. Initially the rules of engagement did not allow for use of deadly force in any cases of theft. However Somalis soon learned this and got into the habit of swarming a vehicle on patrol or convoy anytime it stopped. All items not tied down were fair game to include weapons and night vision goggles.<sup>53</sup> Units requested through the Commander Joint Task Force Somalia (the U.S. forces headquarters deployed to control Operation RESTORE HOPE) to USCENTCOM and soon received permission to use deadly force to prevent theft of weapons and night vision goggles because their theft represented a clear and present danger to force protection. If Somalis had been able to steal weapons commanders deemed that a soldier's ability to protect himself would be limited. Additionally, the theft of night vision devices would allow the Somalis to have a greatly improved ability that increased the threat to nighttime U.S. operations.<sup>54</sup> Otherwise the ROE did not allow for use of deadly force in theft situations unless it directly threatened the soldier's life.

Because the deadly force and theft portions of the ROE caused confusion, the 10th Mountain Division G3 and Staff Judge Advocate developed example situation cards. These cards described complex situations and then requested an appropriate ROE response. The cards provided answers with the scenarios and all units down to squad level received copies. These along with small unit

training exercises conducted before and during deployment to Somalia aided greatly in successfully and legally enforcing the USCENTCOM ROE.<sup>55</sup>

Many situations dealing with crowds and petty theft clearly did not warrant deadly force as defined by the ROE. Compounding this problem was a reluctance by some to use deadly force when appropriate because of pending courts martial cases of others who did not follow the ROE properly. Some felt the risk of prosecution to be greater than the threat from Somalis. Both of these restrictions on deadly force resulted in injury to U.S. personnel.<sup>56</sup>

Some of these incidents actually resulted in serious injuries that could have been prevented. Conditions in Somalia required a new set of non-lethal methods that offered a legal and effective solution to protect troops and their equipment. Initially night sticks, tent pegs, and clubs served the purpose in non-lethal but threatening situations. Some units fastened concertina wire around the outer edges of their vehicles to discourage theft and marauding crowds.<sup>57</sup> Unit commanders then requested the use of Chemical Smoke, (CS) grenades and Cayenne Pepper Spray to discourage criminals and thieves.<sup>58</sup> Use of riot control agents (RCA's) such as CS and Cayenne Pepper Spray requires Presidential approval according to Joint Pub 3-11 and Executive Order 11850.<sup>59</sup>

Units received approval and Cayenne Pepper Spray proved particularly effective in preventing theft, dispersing unruly crowds, and protecting soldiers against hostile acts without the

use of deadly force. In general non-lethal methods, tactics, and weapons proved an effective and important addition required in OOTW. With their use come all the usual training and resourcing of requirements for completion at home station and as refresher training during deployment. Additionally, the ROE must take into account for these non-lethal methods and cover their employment. As mentioned above some non-lethal weapons such as CS and Cayenne Pepper Spray require National Command Authority approval for use and thus need prior planning to ensure their availability in the operational area.<sup>60</sup>

In Somalia force protection included personal protective measures. Commanders ordered soldiers to wear helmets and flak vests at all times. Additionally, units sand bagged vehicles and used a variety methods to harden base camps and all troop locations. This highlights the nature of OOTW where there will probably be no linearly defined area where safety from threats does not require the use of personal protection. All areas are apt to be at some level of risk. Units in convoy and on missions such as food distribution away from base camps are at the greatest risk.<sup>61</sup>

In Somalia such areas are where the warlords chose to engage isolated U.S. personnel and vehicles primarily through mines. Because mining became such a large threat to wheeled and light skinned vehicles the use of sand bags was common. High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles or HMMVs on average had 60 sand bags placed on the floor and seats to protect against pressure and command detonated mines. Base camps and compounds had sand bag



bunkers, concertina wire and tank ditches emplaced. Although the Somalis had no tanks or armored vehicles, U.S. forces used anti-tank ditches to protect themselves against car bombings. The ditches prevented a vehicle from approaching U.S. compounds as had happened in the USMC Compound in the Beirut bombing of October 1983.<sup>62</sup>

With respect to the protection of equipment the Aviation Brigade of 10th Mountain Division discovered that there is no Army doctrine or procedure for the design, construction, or use of revetments for Army helicopters. However, double stacked CONEXs and Sea Land Containers provided protection for headquarters, motor parks, and aircraft against small arms and the shaped charges of RPG rounds with effective results. All of these protective measures and modifications to the ROE require timely and accurate intelligence support which in the OOTW environment is primarily human based information.<sup>63</sup>

In Somalia human intelligence or HUMINT proved the most effective form of intelligence. The vast array of U.S. technical capabilities available to collect intelligence were of little value. Sources of HUMINT included SOF reconnaissance, counter intelligence teams, divisional long range surveillance teams (LRSD) and infantry patrols. Detailed debriefing checklists became a valuable tool to gather all HUMINT data from U.S. military personnel, Non-Governmental Organizations, and allies conducting operations. Intelligence officers at all levels developed checklists based on experience acquired in country.

Detailed and time sensitive HUMINT helped support all force protection requirements.

Just as the presence of infantry patrols supported the HUMINT collection effort it also affected force protection directly. The 10th Mountain Division reported good results stemming from continuous armed patrols in the streets of Mogadishu.<sup>64</sup> One 10th Mountain Division field grade officer felt that Somalis became very aggressive during Operation CONTINUE HOPE because armed patrols declined from previous levels.<sup>65</sup>

Infantry enabled the JTF to apply a graduated response. If the rules of engagement or the situation did not warrant deadly force, then aviation and armored units proved limited in their ability to influence the situation. A well trained and disciplined infantry force could apply non-lethal means to protect themselves or relief missions and in many cases defuse a situation before it came to armed confrontation. In addition to these abilities an infantry battalion could still coordinate a combined arms response if necessary. A graduated response ability helped avoid all confrontations from developing into full blown fire fights by leaving individual Somalis and armed groups several options upon contact with U.S. forces.<sup>66</sup>

However, a critical part of protection in all confrontations with Somali gunmen was a clear understanding that U.S. forces could and would escalate to overwhelming and deadly force if necessary. Without such an understanding U.S. forces risk unnecessary conflict with potential adversaries in OOTW missions.

As the actions of the 10th Mountain Division in Somalia suggest, a need exists for a common understanding of force protection in U.S. Army doctrine. That Division chose to make force protection a Battlefield Operating System (BOS) to ensure its proper coordination, definition, and execution.<sup>67</sup> Development of a standard force protection BOS is possible by conducting a survey of current Army doctrine and combining the experiences of the past and present in OOTW type operations.

## V FORCE PROTECTION IN DOCTRINE

No two Army manuals that define Force Protection have the same definitions. Perhaps that is because numerous agencies are responsible for doctrine and coordination between them needs work. More likely is that force protection as a concept is currently evolving based on recent experience and thought. 10th Mountain Division's use of Force Protection as a BOS in Somalia was its first use as such. Examination of the current Army publications gives some insight as to the possible components of a Force Protection BOS. How actual experience in Somalia and the Philippines could modify those components into a BOS comes in a later discussion.

U.S. Army FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993 lists force protection in two locations. The first location concerns air defense measures used to protect against air and missile attack. Only two sentences explain this portion of protection and they appropriate apply to the air defense BOS.<sup>68</sup> The second discussion

of protection, not force protection, falls under the section titled "dynamics of combat power."

As listed in FM 100-5 those dynamics are maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership. In war, a unit's relative combat power is a subjective evaluation of the complementary nature of these factors. The manual defines protection as consisting of:

1. Operations Security and Deception
2. Protecting Health and Maintaining Morale
3. Safety
4. Prevention of Fratricide<sup>69</sup>

These components of protection are adequate in war time when the other elements of maneuver and firepower are applied as needed. However, in OOTW the political realities and nature of the mission place limits on firepower and maneuver. As chapter 13 of FM 100-5 outlines, differences in OOTW will require restraint on the use of force.<sup>70</sup> The requirement to insure low casualties will remain, then protection's role expands and requires greater detail than that listed in FM 100-5. 10th Mountain Division's staff planning actions concerning protection reflected this effect.

Adding to the importance of protection is the frequency of OOTW missions and their relatively low importance to national security.<sup>71</sup> As a result light forces may become the OOTW units of choice. The small amount of heavy equipment in light units reduces transportation and sustainment requirements already strained under the load of increased deployments. For OOTW, a

light unit may provide the necessary combat power at a reduced cost compared to heavier units.<sup>72</sup>

As recent experience shows, even OOTW missions can temporarily take on the characteristics of traditional warfare. This places a commander in the average OOTW environment in a dilemma. He is likely to be deficient in the elements of maneuver and firepower for situations that could require all those elements just as normal combat operations would. One area an OOTW commander can affect through training, planning, and coordination is protection. Protection may be the difference between continuing the mission or receiving a mandate to end the operation as soon as possible as happened in Somalia after the failed raid of 3 October 1993.

The preface to FM 100-5, June 1993 says "Army operations doctrine builds on the collective knowledge and wisdom gained through recent conduct of operations<sup>73</sup>, combat as well as operations other than war." The lessons coming out of Somalia were not available in time for inclusion in the writing of the June 1993 version. However, FM 100-5's chapter 13 entitled Operations Other Than War or OOTW does offer some principle's that guide military actions in OOTW. Two of those principle's have a direct relation to force protection and the need for it. One is SECURITY defined as "never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage." The other is RESTRAINT defined as "apply appropriate military capability prudently."<sup>74</sup> Although these two principles describe the dilemma that a commander in OOTW must face, maintaining protection of his force but limited in his

options of applying force, they offer little in understanding what should constitute force protection. To get a better understanding one must examine three other Army manuals, FM 100-20, TRADOC PAM 525-56 and TRADOC PAM 11-9.

FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict 5 December 1990, is the current Army manual concerned with OOTW type missions. It defines force protection as:

A security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personnel protective services, and supported by counterintelligence and other security programs.<sup>75</sup>

This is clearly a different and broader scope definition than that offered in FM 100-5. However there is no chapter or paragraph in FM 100-20 that describes how a commander or unit should plan for and conduct force protection programs and missions. No one staff section receives priority for coordination, planning, integration, and execution of force protection in this definition. The level of detail lacking here for force protection is available in TRADOC PAM 11-9, but only for the established Battlefield Operating Systems.

In TRADOC PAM 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield, describes Protection as a mission to be performed at the strategic and operational levels concerned with operations security, theater level air defense, and combating terrorism. No listing for force protection at the tactical level exists. Likewise, how the

tactical BOS's support the strategic and operational protection missions does not exist.<sup>76</sup>

The latest reference to force protection in an Army manual is in TRADOC PAM 525-56, Planner's Guide for Military Operations Other Than War. Section 2-4 of that manual lists Physical Security, Operations Security, Counter Intelligence, and Deception Operations as components of force protection with only three short paragraphs on each area and no explanation of how to conduct it.<sup>77</sup>

In all the current Army manuals that mention force protection all have different definitions and none of them provide sufficient detail to have been worthwhile in establishing the parameters needed by 10th Mountain Division in Somalia. In short, there is no standard definition for force protection in U.S. Army doctrine. FM 100-5's assertion that doctrine should be based on recent experience, such as 10th Mountain Division's, indicates a need for a force protection BOS. However, in examination of where force protection is found in current doctrine and operational experience it should only be a BOS for the restraining conditions of OOTW.

## VII RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The current Army doctrine and experience in Somalia combined with lessons from the "Philippine War" illustrate that operations other than war are a continuing mission for the U.S. armed forces. The Army has recently recognized that with the inclusion of a chapter on operations other than war in the most current version

of FM 100-5. The effort of this study has been to take those lessons, one recent and one historical, combined with our current doctrine and search for the answer on how a commander can best protect his soldiers. When 10th Mountain Division in its operations in Somalia asked how to best protect its soldiers the answer was a force protection BOS. What remains for study is to capture that experience and combine it with lessons from the past to discover the important trends and develop an effective doctrinal solution.

A possible solution is to follow 10th Mountain Division's lead and implement a force protection BOS combined with pertinent lessons from history such as the Philippine War. With these examples in mind the following tables suggest an addition to TRADOC PAM 11-9's Blueprint of the Battlefield for the tactical level BOS's. These tables describe the "Force Protection" BOS and should apply only to operations other than war for reasons already mentioned. In keeping with that pamphlet an eighth BOS would be numbered TA.8 with major components numbered TA.8.1, TA.8.2 and so on. The following tables are prepared in keeping with this numbering system in mind.<sup>78</sup>



TABLE 1

TA.8 FORCE PROTECTION

- TA.8.1 DEVELOP, IMPLEMENT, REVIEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
- TA.8.2 DETERMINE THREATS TO FORCE PROTECTION
- TA.8.3 PLAN FOR AND PROVIDE SECURITY MEASURES
- TA.8.4 PLAN FOR AND EMPLOY NON-LETHAL WEAPONS
- TA.8.5 MAINTAIN LEGITIMACY

Each major components of the force protection BOS breaks down into its important parts for a comprehensive planning list. This will assist in accomplishing the definition of a BOS's purpose listed in FM 100-5.

BOSs enable a comprehensive examination in a straightforward manner that facilitates the integration, coordination, preparation, and execution of successful combined arms operations.<sup>79</sup>

Therefore the following set of tables expand on the five proposed sub-categories of the force protection BOS.

TABLE 2

TA.8.1 DEVELOP, IMPLEMENT, REVIEW RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

TA.8.1.1 DEVELOP ROE

- TA.8.1.1.1 DETERMINE APPROPRIATE ISSUING HEADQUARTERS/AUTHORITY FOR THE ROE
- TA.8.1.1.2 RESOLVE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN, STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL LEVEL GUIDANCE
- TA.8.1.1.3 RECEIVE LEGAL GUIDANCE AS NECESSARY

#### TA.8.1.2 IMPLEMENT ROE

- TA.8.1.2.1 ISSUE ROE CARDS
- TA.8.1.2.2 ISSUE IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE CHAIN OF COMMAND
- TA.8.1.2.3 CONDUCT SITUATIONAL TRAINING EXERCISES
- TA.8.1.2.4 PERFORM SMALL UNIT CERTIFICATION PROCESS FOR ROE COMPETENCE
- TA.8.1.2.5 IMPLEMENT ROE
- TA.8.1.2.6 CONDUCT INVESTIGATIONS OF ROE VIOLATIONS AS NECESSARY
- TA.8.1.2.7 TAKE APPROPRIATE LEGAL ACTION

#### TA.8.1.3 REVIEW ROE

- TA.8.1.3.1 CONDUCT AAR WITH UNITS CONDUCTING OPERATIONS
- TA.8.1.3.2 DETERMINE NEEDED CHANGES TO ROE AND SUBMIT TO APPROPRIATE HEADQUARTERS FOR APPROVAL
- TA.8.1.3.3 RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM HIGHER HEADQUARTERS ON CHANGES TO ROE AND IMPLEMENT

#### TA.8.1.4 PREVENT FRATRICIDE\*

- TA.8.1.4.1 ESTABLISH RECOGNITION MARKINGS AND PROCEDURES
- TA.8.1.4.2 USE DISCIPLINED OPERATIONAL MEASURES AND RESTRAINT
- TA.8.1.4.3 MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS, ESPECIALLY DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

\*FM 100-5 includes fratricide as a part of protection in the dynamics of combat power section.<sup>80</sup>

There are special information considerations for OOTW that differ greatly compared to war. Mainly these consist of the types of threats and sources of intelligence. Although the intelligence BOS components cover some of the information needed for OOTW there is sufficient difference to warrant a component on threats in the force protection BOS.<sup>81</sup>

TABLE 3

TA.8.2 DETERMINE THREATS TO FORCE PROTECTION

TA.8.2.1 ITEMS FOR COORDINATION WITH THE INTEL BOS

- TA.8.2.1.1 DETERMINE ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: DISEASES, FLORA/FAUNA ISSUES, WEATHER ISSUES, POLLUTION ISSUES
- TA.8.2.1.2 DETERMINE OPERATIONAL HAZARDS TO INCLUDE NON-TRADITIONAL WEAPONS' THREATS, ASSOCIATION LIABILITIES OF COALITION PARTNERS, AND READINESS/RELIABILITY OF COALITION REACTION FORCES
- TA.8.2.1.3 CONDUCT EXTERNAL COORDINATION FOR INFORMATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, NON-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES, AND COALITION PARTNERS
- TA.8.2.1.4 UNDERSTAND LOCAL POLITICS, CUSTOMS, SENSITIVITIES, AND NEEDS

TA.8.2.2 DETERMINE INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS\*

- TA.8.2.2.1 DETERMINE HOST NATION CAPABILITIES, SHORTFALLS TO UNIT REQUIREMENTS FOR BILLETING
- TA.8.2.2.2 DETERMINE HOST NATION CAPABILITIES, SHORTFALLS TO UNIT REQUIREMENTS IN WATER SOURCES
- TA.8.2.2.3 DETERMINE HOST NATION CAPABILITIES, SHORTFALLS TO UNIT REQUIREMENTS FOR SANITATION FACILITIES
- TA.8.2.2.4 EVALUATE IMPACT OF INADEQUATE LANDING AREAS TO LONG TERM AVIATION OPERATIONS

\* This component must be coordination with the Combat Service Support function. The issue of inadequate landing areas has two reasons for inclusion. First, aviation operations in austere dry countries such as Somalia are hampered by the effect of debilitating dust clouds kicked up during take off and landings better known as "brown-outs." The other issue concerns those same dust clouds causing premature engine and blade replacements due to abnormal wear and tear. Paved landing areas therefore prevent some of these problems thus enhancing safety and maintenance in rotary wing operations.<sup>82</sup>

Attention to security measures is vitally important in OOTW due to the tendency to become complacent in low threat environments. Therefore a comprehensive checklist for security tends to remind participants of all its parts and importance.

#### TABLE 4

##### TA.8.3 PROVIDE SECURITY

###### TA.8.3.1 COUNTER TERRORISM

- TA.8.3.1.1 IMPLEMENT ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAMS AS NECESSARY
- TA.8.3.1.2 COORDINATE FOR SPECIAL OPERATION SUPPORT AS NEEDED

###### TA.8.3.2 CONDUCT OPERATIONS SECURITY (OPSEC)

- TA.8.3.2.1 PROTECT ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION (EEFI)
- TA.8.3.2.2 USE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AND COORDINATE WITH COALITION NATIONS FOR NON-STANDARD METHODS
- TA.8.3.2.3 CONDUCT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

###### TA.8.3.3 CONDUCT DECEPTION

###### TA.8.3.4 CONDUCT PHYSICAL SECURITY

- TA.8.3.4.1 CONDUCT ACTIVE PATROLLING PROGRAM
- TA.8.3.4.2 IMPLEMENT SPECIAL ANTI-CRIME/THEFT PROGRAMS
- TA.8.3.4.3 PROVIDE CONVOY, CHECKPOINT, DETACHED ELEMENT SECURITY
- TA.8.3.4.4 BASE FACILITY DESIGN ON THREAT
- TA.8.3.4.5 IMPLEMENT USE OF ADDITIONAL VEHICLE AND BODY ARMOR AND PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AS NECESSARY

The next component of force protection deserves a brief explanation. Because of crime, theft, and civil disturbance situations, mainly food riots, in Somalia missions became

difficult to conduct. The rules of engagement in many cases prevented use of deadly force. However some situations did prove dangerous to equipment and limb. One alternative to this situation is no response. This only emboldens the populace placing US. forces at greater risk as time goes by.<sup>83</sup> The other alternative is the use of non-lethal weapons. These weapons proved very effective in deterring the above problems but were not without problems themselves. First, they require approval for use. In case of irritants and incapacitating agents such as CS and cayenne pepper spray the National Command Authority must grant approval for use. Therefore units must make an initial request for its use, preferably before deployment. Second, units need training and special equipment to employ non-lethal weapons. Cayenne pepper spray can cause health complications to those in poor condition for instance.<sup>84</sup> This means an addition to the ROE for non-lethal weapons is required.

Therefore the following table is recommended as the component outline for planning, training and use of these weapons in the role of force protection.

TABLE 5

#### TA.8.4 PLANNING FOR AND USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

##### TA.8.4.1 REQUEST AUTHORIZATION TO USE NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

- TA.8.4.1.1 DETERMINE AVAILABLE WEAPONS e.g. CS GRENADES, CAYENNE PEPPER SPRAY, ELECTRO-SHOCK DEVICES, LASERS, CLUBS/NIGHT STICKS, RUBBER BULLETS, WATER CANNONS, ANESTA DARTS ...<sup>85</sup>
- TA.8.4.1.2 REQUEST LEGAL AND TECHNICAL ADVICE FROM INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SOURCES BEFORE OPERATIONS

- TA.8.4.1.3 REQUEST AUTHORIZATION FOR USE FROM APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF AUTHORITY FOR EACH PARTICULAR WEAPON TO BE USED BEFORE OPERATIONS

TA.8.4.2 CONDUCT NON-LETHAL WEAPONS TRAINING

- TA.8.4.2.1 CONDUCT INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING ON USE OF NON-LETHAL WEAPONS BEFORE OPERATIONS
- TA.8.4.2.2 INCLUDE SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THESE WEAPONS IN THE WRITTEN ROE AND INCLUDE IN ROE TRAINING EXERCISES

TA.8.4.3 EMPLOY NON-LETHAL WEAPONS

- TA.8.4.3.1 EMPLOY THESE WEAPONS AS NEEDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ROE
- TA.8.4.3.2 ASSESS WEAPON EFFECTIVENESS
- TA.8.4.3.3 DETERMINE MODIFICATION TO ROE AND WEAPONS' USE WITHIN LEGAL AUTHORIZATION AS NEEDED<sup>86</sup>

The final component of the force protection BOS addresses the intangible aspect of OOTW, legitimacy. If a commander and his unit can maintain good relations and communications with all concerned in the operational area then he may prevent the need for use of force in the first place. Many of the following ideas are indicative of the U.S. Army, good soldiers, and leaders anyway but they are included as a reminder of what has historically caused the U.S. armed forces to lose legitimacy.

TABLE 6

TA.8.5 MAINTAIN LEGITIMACY

TA.8.5.1 MAINTAIN IMPARTIALITY

- TA.8.5.1.1 AVOID DEROGATORY ACTIONS/LANGUAGE TOWARDS ANY GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL TO INCLUDE ALLIES
- TA.8.5.1.2 AVOID FINANCIAL OR PROFITABLE DEALINGS WITH SINGLE GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS THAT AFFORDS THEM SPECIAL ADVANTAGES
- TA.8.5.1.3 AVOID PROPAGANDA, PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS, OR INFORMATION SHARING THAT IS DIRECTED AT A SINGLE GROUP OR INDIVIDUAL
- TA.8.5.1.4 DEAL WITH ALL EXTERNAL AGENCIES, GROUPS, AND INDIVIDUALS FAIRLY AND CONSISTENTLY

TA.8.5.2 MAINTAIN PROFESSIONALISM

- TA.8.5.2.1 MAINTAIN HIGH STANDARDS OF MILITARY BEARING DISCIPLINE, AND APPEARANCE
- TA.8.5.2.2 AVOID OVERLY FAMILIAR CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE
- TA.8.5.2.3 RESPECT LOCAL CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS
- TA.8.5.2.4 ENFORCE THE ROE AT ALL TIMES AND CONSISTENTLY
- TA.8.5.2.5 KEEP SOLDIERS, ALLIES, OTHER AGENCIES, AND LOCAL POPULACE INFORMED OF US ACTIONS AND INTENT WITHIN MISSION CONSTRAINTS (e.g. USE OF A CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER OR CMOC)<sup>87</sup>

In the near future OOTW missions are likely to be the most common type operations the military will conduct. As of this writing the United States is involved in OOTW missions in Haiti, Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, Rwanda, Panama's Cuban refugee camps, and the Persian Gulf to name a few. In most of the recent OOTW missions, e.g. Somalia and Haiti, the number one concern for commanders and soldiers has been force protection.<sup>88</sup> Since force protection is a vital concept in today's armed forces it is time the tactical commander had a comprehensive method to plan and

executive his responsibilities in this realm. This monograph shows that institution of a Force Protection BOS would help achieve OOTW missions more effectively. Additionally, the tables included offer a detailed analysis of the component parts for inclusion in force protection planning and execution.

The American people demand perfection of their Armed Forces. Unnessary casualties causes a precious loss of life and the public's confidence. Commanders are duty bound to protect both. Hopefully a force protection Battlefield Operating System for OOTW will allow commanders and staffs to accomplish their mission closer to the ideal the people expect. Most importantly, such a planning method may save our soldiers' lives.



## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> The White House, A National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994), pp 5-8. This annual report to the Congress by the President outlines the current and future foreign policy of the United States.
- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993), pp 13-0 thru 13-4. This edition of FM 100-5 introduced the term Operations Other Than War or OOTW.
- <sup>3</sup> Barry R. McCaffrey, GEN USA, Insitute For National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1994), pp 5-6. GEN McCaffrey states that the reason for U.S. involvement in Somalia came as a result of the failure of earlier UN efforts.
- <sup>4</sup> Ibid, p xiv. The figures on losses comes from the editor's preface by Dennis J. Quinn.
- <sup>5</sup> John McCain, Senator, US Congress; Insitute For National Strategic Studies, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, February 1994), pp 85-87.
- <sup>6</sup> FM 100-5, p 13-3 and 13-4.
- <sup>7</sup> COL Gregory Fontenot. The concept that lessons from the Philippine War and operations in Somalia might be similar and prove insightful came from comments made by the above, Director of the School of Advanced Military Studies during prospectus development.
- <sup>8</sup> Gregory J.W. Urwin, The United States Infantry: An Illustrated History 1775-1918 (New York, NY: Streling Publishing Co., 1988), pp 140-141.
- <sup>9</sup> Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp 59-60 and 131-132. The background information on the scope of the Spanish American War and Commodore Dewey's actions in Manila Bay is provided as an explanation for American involvement in the Philippines.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., pp 117-120.

- <sup>11</sup> Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, (New York, NY: William Morrow and Co., 1994) pp 123-126. The discussion of the political dilemma facing President McKinley comes from Asprey's chapter 11 on the causes of the Philippine War.
- <sup>12</sup> Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of the United States Military Strategy and Policy. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1973) pg. 183-186.
- <sup>13</sup> William McElwee, The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1974), pg 277.
- <sup>14</sup> Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother. pp 65-70. The controversy over whether officials of the United States had promised independence was a considerable obstacle to reconciliation for later negotiations.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., pp 225-228.
- <sup>16</sup> Gerald H. Early, The United States Army in the Philippine Insurrection, 1899-1902. (Ft Leavenworth, Ks.: MMAS Thesis for CGSC, 1975), pp 69-73.
- <sup>17</sup> Brian McAllister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), pp 12-13.
- <sup>18</sup> Gregory J.W. Urwin, The United States Infantry. pg 144.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp 144-146.
- <sup>20</sup> William T. Sexton, Soldiers in the Sun: An Adventure in Imperialism. (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1939), pp 226-231.
- <sup>21</sup> Brian McAlliister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. pp 69-77.
- <sup>22</sup> Joseph L. Scott, The Ordeal of Samar. (New York, NY: Bobbs-Merrill Co. , 1964) pp 26-42. This section of the book describes in detail the atrocities meted out by both American soldiers and Filipino insurgents which only escalated the brutality of the conflict instead of contributing to its successful conclusion.
- <sup>23</sup> Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. pg 130.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., pp 130-131.

<sup>25</sup> In a speech to the students of the School of Advanced Military Studies on 8 December 1994, a high government official stated that if military operations were going to be supported by the American people they had to be successful, efficient, and with the absolute minimal amount of casualties incurred.

<sup>26</sup> Brian McAlliister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. pp 75-77.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp 42-43.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., pg 148.

<sup>29</sup> Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History. pg 131-133.

<sup>30</sup> Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother. pp 20-21.

<sup>31</sup> Joseph L. Scott, The Ordeal of Samar. pp 158-162.

<sup>32</sup> Brian McAlliister Linn, The US Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902. pp 152-155.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., pp 156-161.

<sup>34</sup> Gregory J.W. Urwin, The United States Infantry. pp 145-149.

<sup>35</sup> These ten points reflect the writer's thoughts on the lessons of the Philippine War. Several of those thoughts developed in discussion with MAJ Patrick E. Fuller, CGSOC Student AY 94-95.

<sup>36</sup> Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope: 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993. (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 7 May 1993), pp 2-3. Additional background information came from Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omaar, Doing Harm by Doing Good? The International Relief Effort in Somalia. (Philadelphia, PA: Current History, A World Affairs Journal, May 1993), pp 198-199.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., pg 2.

<sup>38</sup> MAJ Steve Haswell, USAF, This information on the PROVIDE RELIEF operation in Somalia is based on several interviews conducted by the author in September and November of 1994. MAJ Haswell is an U.S. Air Force Combat Controller (CCT) and as the senior CCT officer in Somalia for PROVIDE RELIEF and early parts of RESTORE HOPE he was responsible for the safe operation of the air space in vicinity of the airfields in Somalia during those early phases.

- <sup>39</sup> After Action Report, US Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (LI). (Fort Drum, NY: HQ 10th Mtn Div, 2 June, 1993), pp 1-2.
- <sup>40</sup> AAR, Operation Restore Hope, pp 3-5.
- <sup>41</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Center for Army Lessons Learned, April 1994), pg I-2-6 and pg B-1.
- <sup>42</sup> Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: UN and the US Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pg 159. Also taken from John R. Bolton (Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations with the Bush Administration), Wrong Turn in Somalia. (New York: Foreign Affairs Magazine, Jan/Feb 1994), pg 63.
- <sup>43</sup> Richard K. Kolb, Combat in the Somalia Sinkhole. (Kansas City, MO.: VFW Magazine, February, 1994) pg 23.
- <sup>44</sup> Kenneth T. Walsh and Gloria Borger, The Unmaking of Foreign Policy. (New York: US News and World Report Magazine, October, 18, 1993), pp 30-31.
- <sup>45</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. pg II-8-1.
- <sup>46</sup> After Action Report, US Army Forces Somalia, 10th Mountain Division (LI). pp 80-84. This paper only covers protection as it relates to the use of Rules of Engagement (ROE). In Somalia the 10th Mountain Division also included 1. Morale, Welfare, and Recreation; 2. Pastoral Care during Operation Restore Hope; 3. Base Camp Construction and Operation; 4. Safety; Medical Operations; and 5. Rear Detachment Operations.
- <sup>47</sup> MAJ Martin N. Stanton, USA, Task Force 2-87: Lessons from Restore Hope. (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Headquarters, Dept of the Army, Military Review, September 1994), pg 35.
- <sup>48</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope. (Fort Leavenworth, KS.: Headquarters, Dept of the Army, Military Review, September 1994), pp 27-28.
- <sup>49</sup> Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope: 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993. pp XIV-2 thru XIV-3.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., pg XIV-4.
- <sup>51</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope. pg 30.

<sup>52</sup> Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope: 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993. pp XIV-4 thru XIV-5. At Appendix G-1 of Coordinating Draft, UNOSOM II the following ROE is listed from US operations in Somalia:

a. Use all necessary force, including deadly force:

(1) To defend yourself, other UN personnel or persons and areas under your protection against the use of force or clear evidence of intent to use force.

(2) To confiscate and demilitarize crew-served weapons.

(3) To disarm and demilitarize individuals in areas under UNOSOM control.

b. Always use the minimum force necessary under the circumstances and proportional to threat.

c. If the tactical situation permits you should give a challenge before using deadly force...

d. Unattended weapons, such as booby traps, mines, and trip guns are prohibited.

e. Detain individuals who interfere with your mission, who use or clearly threaten deadly force, or who commit criminal acts in areas under UNOSOM control. Evacuate detainees to designated location for turnover to military police. Treat all detainees humanly.

f. Do not seize civilian property without your commander's authorization.

g. Treat all persons with dignity and respect.

h. Organized, armed militia, technicals, and other crew-served weapons are considered a threat to UNOSOM forces and may be engaged without provocation.

<sup>53</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope. pg 30-32.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., pg 31.

<sup>55</sup> Lessons Learned Report, Operation Restore Hope: 3 December 1992 - 4 May 1993. pp XIV-6 thru XIV-16.

<sup>56</sup> Jonathan T. Dworken, Rules of Engagement: Lessons from Restore Hope. pp 26 and 31.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., pg 30.

<sup>58</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. pg II-8-6.

<sup>59</sup> Joint Pub 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, Chemical (NBC) Defense. Washington, DC: Joint Doctrine Division J7 of Joint Staff Pentagon, pg III-7/8, 15 April 1994. This section sites that instructions for use of RCA's comes from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and Presidential authority. The Judge Advocate General's office on Fort Leavenworth, KS also stated that the original source for approving authority comes from Executive Order 11850, date unknown.

<sup>60</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. pg II-8-8 thru II-8-9.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp II-8-1 and II-8-12.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., pp II-4-17, II-5-7 thru II-5-8

<sup>63</sup> MAJ Jeff Colt, USA, In two interviews conducted with this Aviation officer (Sep and Nov 1994) the author discovered this information. Page II-5-7 of the previous document also confirms the accuracy of MAJ Colt's information. MAJ Colt served in Somalia during Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope as the Aide de Camp to MG S.L. Arnold (Dec 1992-Aug 1993), then to MG David C. Meade (Aug 1993-Jan 1994) both Commanding Generals of the 10th Mountain Division.

<sup>64</sup> AAR, US Army Forces, Somalia. pp 3-4, 30-33.

<sup>65</sup> MAJ Jeff Colt, This information is based on this officer's opinion albeit a rather well informed one as he was the Aide for both Commanding Generals of 10th Mountain Division for nearly the entire time of the Somalia involvement for US forces.

<sup>66</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. pg II-8-10 thru II-8-11.

<sup>67</sup> MG S.L. Arnold and MAJ David T. Stahl, A Power Projection Army in Operations Other Than War. (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Parameters, Winter 1993-1994), pg 14.

<sup>68</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993. pg 2-13.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., pp 2-10 thru 2-11.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pg 2-13.

<sup>71</sup> Jerome H. Kahan, Peace Support Operations and the US Military: Peace Support Operations: Senior Military

Perspectives. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994), pg 80.

<sup>72</sup> AAR, US Army Forces, Somalia. pp 36, 59.

<sup>73</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993. pg iv.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid., pg 13-4.

<sup>75</sup> FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. (Washington, DC: HQ Department of the Army, 5 Dec 1990), pg Glossary 3.

<sup>76</sup> TRADOC PAM 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield. (Fort Monroe, VA.: HQ TRADOC, 1989), TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint Chart.

<sup>77</sup> TRADOC PAM 525-56, Planner's Guide for Military Operations Other Than War. (Fort Monroe, Va.: HQ TRADOC, 1 Sep 1993), pp 8-9.

<sup>78</sup> TRADOC PAM 11-9, Blueprint of the Battlefield. Blueprint Chart.

<sup>79</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993. pg 2-13.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., pp 2-10 and 2-11.

<sup>81</sup> Based on a comparison between the Intelligence BOS from TRADOC PAM 11-9 and pages 30-33 of the AAR, US Forces, Somalia.

<sup>82</sup> These items concerning safety are included due to their importance to 10th Mountain Division's operations in Somalia. As already stated in an earlier endnote safety, morale, welfare, pastoral care, medical operations... were a part of the force protection BOS for the Division's planning. Due to space limitations those components not related to ROE were left out of the body of the paper. In order to show other BOS components suggested by 10th Mountain Division's precedent they are included here for completeness.

<sup>83</sup> MAJ Jeff Colt, The concept is based on this officer's opinion after long term service in the Somalia operations.

<sup>84</sup> This is based on the author's experience in his hometown where he witnessed a demonstration in which an individual was sprayed with Cayenne Pepper Spray who went into cardiac arrest and died. Subsequent local news reporting stated that poor health contributed to the expanded effects of the spray.

<sup>85</sup> Coordinating Draft, US Army Forces in Support of UNOSOM II. pp II-8-6 and II-8-8.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, pg II-8-6. The need to develop Non-Lethal Weapons ROE is not directly stated in any document the author was able to locate. However, this page does say that non-lethal means can enhance force protection. The logic leap then is to see the need for non-lethal ROE.

<sup>87</sup> Dent Ocaya-Lakidi, Peace Support Operations and the U.S. Military: UN and the US Military Roles in Regional Organizations in Africa and the Middle East. These ideas are developed from this section by Mr Ocaya-Lakidi in his explanation of the failings of the United States in regional peace support missions.

<sup>88</sup> Taken from a briefing given by LTC Menard, USA to Seminar 1, SAMS on his participation in the Chief of Staff of the Army's (US) inter-agency coordination group for the mission to restore Jean Bertrand Aristide to power in Haiti. In that briefing he stated that for Somalia, Haiti and all current operations force protection was the number one concern for commanders.



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